Abstract-Red teaming, as it has been traditionally practiced, cannot adequately support assessment of the kinds of system of systems that IOT and related technologies will deliver. Ways must be found to transfer responsibility for system assessment from humans to the systems themselves. This will require an intentional, fundamental reframing of how the system assessment R&D community approaches its work.0 F 1
II. HOW IT IS DONE TODAY
Before discussing what this approach might need to entail, it is useful to characterize the general approach embodied by the current generation of assessment methods and to identify where this approach falls short. Figure 1 depicts the flow of activities entailed in executing current methods. The elements in the upper half of the diagram represent the information and activities that are held inside the heads of the subject matter experts (SMEs) conducting an assessment. The elements in the lower half represent those things that are explicitly documented or executed using mechanisms outside the SMEs.
Before the assessment process is begun, an initial survey of the system in question is conducted in order to identify the kinds of technical and application domain expertise needed on the assessment team. SMEs are then selected for the team based on their knowledge in the identified areas of expertise. While some members of the team will serve as generalists, taking responsibility for the integrated view of the system that emerges from modeling and analysis activities, most of the SMEs will be narrowly focused on those aspects of the system for which they possess expertise. One SME may address the system's mechanical aspects, another the electrical, yet another the computing aspects, and so on.
The team begins its assessment by collecting and digesting information about the subject system. As shown in the figure, this information can be drawn from explicit sources (e.g., from computer-based files or paper-based reports or from insights gained via discovery, as in penetration testing) or from implicit knowledge held within the heads of the individuals who design, manufacture, operate, etc. the system. The SMEs combine what they discover with the technical and operational domain-specific expertise they already possess in order to create a model that represents their understanding of the system. While they may use tools to explicitly document the "system model", this model they create is often not complete, as much of what they learn about the system may remain exclusively in their heads. In some analytic methods, this explicit model may be cast so as to analyzable by automated tools, but it is not uncommon for it to serve primarily as a mnemonic device that provides SMEs with a way of documenting the connection between the facts that they have discovered and as way of indexing back into the much larger implicit portion of the system model held in the SMEs' heads.
Because of specialization of roles that can occur within a red team, the implicit model is often a federation of multiple, smaller implicit models, each of which addresses a particular domain-specific view of the system and each of which is held in the head of a different team member. Except in the case of very small systems, it is rare for any one individual on a team to possess comprehensive insight into all of these views of the system. For this reason, technical vulnerability assessments can be intensely collaborative processes.
After modeling the system, the red team assesses it for vulnerabilities that could undermine the system's safety and security. Analyses executed by the SME specialists will be discipline-specific. The way that software is analyzed will differ from the ways in which a facility or a human activity are analyzed; the way the team analyzes how specific system elements can fail can differ from how it understands the ways in which the collective system can fail. As with modeling, analyses can be both explicit and implicit. Explicit analyses will draw on the explicit portions of the system model and may employ automated tools to generate analysis results. The implicit analyses will be mental activities executed completely within the heads of the SME team, drawing on both explicit and implicit portions of the system model, as well as knowledge the SMEs possess related to vulnerabilities common to the elements of the system being assessed, to what can exploit them, and to what kinds of scenarios might enable these exploits.
Finally, this bifurcation into explicit and implicit can extend into the reporting aspects of system assessment. When the SME team shares its findings, only a portion of everything found may be conveyed to assessment stakeholders. This kind of abridgement may be a response to guidance from team customers but can also be rooted in SME team biases regarding what matters and what does not. That the SME team even holds these biases may not be apparent to the team members themselves [4] .
Technical vulnerability assessment is normally executed during a system's development to enable hardening of the system against whatever adverse conditions it is expected to encounter once deployed. It can be executed post-deployment, as well, to ensure that the system remains safe and/or secure in its operational context. This assessment in light of anticipated threats, which has been referred to as the "fortress" approach to system assurance, hinges on correctly predicting the full range of adverse conditions that the system will face and accurately assessing the system's response to these things. While this may be possible with relatively simple systems operating in wellcharacterized environments, realizing comprehensive, a priori identification of concerns in the system of systems world that IOT and related technologies will enable will be extremely challenging, if even achievable.
III. A DIFFERENT APPROACH
If this problem is to be solved, responsibility for assessment of systems must shift from human red teams to the systems themselves. Systems must be enabled to know themselves and their missions, to sense and interpret their environments, and to respond to events in order to preserve themselves and to ensure continuity of missions they support. Early expressions of this strategy can be seen in some fielded systems today. Modern network protection typically features the ability to both assess current state of network elements and to respond automatically to identified concerns [5] . Recent work has demonstrated the ability of systems to do this even when the threat is novel [6] . Figure 2 is a notional view of the kind of evolution that will occur on the way from current system assurance approaches to a future in which systems protect themselves. The figure's two axes embody five key abilities: 1) the ability to observe the subject system and its context, 2) the ability to interpret these observations in order to frame a model of the system and its context, 3) the ability to reason about this model in order to identify potential current and future concerns, 4) the ability to consider potential responses to these concerns, to evaluate costs and impacts of these responses, and to choose the "best" response, and 5) the ability to implement the chosen response. Note that the first three abilities correspond exactly to the major elements of technical vulnerability assessment presented in Figure 1 . They are also foundational elements on which the IOT-enabled future of autonomous systems will rest [7] . 
IV. MOVING TOWARD THIS APPROACH
This move from SME-driven red teaming to system selfassessment will not occur unless pursued intentionally. The necessary starting point is a simple but radical conceptual shift in how the system assessment R&D community thinks. In the author's experience, much of the methodological literature consists of humans explaining to other humans how to approach given aspects of assessment. These papers often leave to it to the human reader to interpret exactly what meaning is encompassed by given words and what detailed steps to take to implement the described approaches. This is not surprising because the expectation for decades has been that humans execute assessments. Moving forward, system assessment R&D must take on greater rigor. Researchers must view automated systems as the intended beneficiaries of research results. Tool developers must design tools for use by automated systems rather than just humans.
To facilitate this shift, four enabling mechanisms should be pursued. The first is an analysis architecture that frames the kinds of questions addressed in system assessments, codifies the kinds of information used in these assessments, and defines how these things relate to each other.
The second is standardization of the language used in system assessment and of the means used to represent these concepts. With some notable exceptions (e.g., the security community's work on common weakness enumeration [8] ), the assessment community lacks shared languages that normalize the terminology entailed in assessment models and that are precise in their meaning and designed for use by automated systems, not just humans. The third enabling mechanism is a technical architecture that guides how analytic tools are constituted and integrated. Since part of the promise of IOT and its sister technologies is the ability to create systems of systems from independent components and systems that are federated at time of use rather than time of design, this technical architecture must include standardized protocols that allow dynamically linked systems to convey information to and request services from each other on the full range of assessment needs these systems might face together. The fourth enabling mechanism is an organization, much like the healthcare community's HL7 [9] , that can serve as the focal point for coordinating development of the analysis and technical architectures, the content that supports them, and the associated language and representational standards. The formation of a centralized organization will be essential in fostering working relationships with the broad range of professional communities needed to make this kind of effort succeed.
All of this is easier said than done. The collective body of effort implied by these four mechanisms is enormous. As such, a workable strategy for reaching the proposed end might be through an evolutionary path that progressively shifts red teaming from operations that are largely human-centric to those that are intensely tool-centric ( Figure 3 ). Early steps along the path would focus on moving toward models that are fully explicit and compliant with community representational standards. At this level, red team work would be reviewable by independent entities. Next steps would pursue development of automated tools for model creation and model analysis. At this level, red team work would become fully repeatable.
Finally, these tools would be integrated into systems to make them capable of assessing and addressing their own assurance postures. Responsibility for framing the exact evolution through these levels would fall to the central organization coordinating work in this domain. This provides a framework for categorizing the assessment community's current body of knowledge. It enables identification and characterization of gaps in this knowledge, giving researchers insight into topics in need of exploration. It also allows work to be divided among different communities of interest, enabling progress to be made in parallel on multiple fronts
While not exhaustive in its coverage, as it focuses only on questions of causality and not risk or threat, Table 1 illustrates the kinds of information that an analysis architecture might contain. Technical system assessment can entail a range of interdependent questions (the "facets" listed in the table). As described in Section II, the "system model" that is at the heart of system assessment is typically composed of multiple interrelated models held by the different SMEs on the red team. In practice, each of these constituent SME "models" are themselves composed of even finer grained models related to each of the facets of assessment identified in Table 1 . For example, an SME tasked with assessing the electrical elements of a subject system will model the system's electrical elements using functional block diagrams (S1B), circuit diagrams (S2B), and populated board layouts (S3B). The SME will identify undesirable states in the electronic subsystems and will relate them to undesirable system outcomes (S1) and will identify inherent vulnerabilities in each of the physical parts contained in the systems (S3B). Natural events and human actions that could exploit these vulnerabilities will be identified (E1B) and lifecycles of each of these electrical elements examined to assess whether these actions or events could occur at any point in their life cycles in ways that could possibly lead to undesired electrical system events (E2B). These findings would be used by physical security SMEs to assess whether the physical structure of the environment could allow for this exploitation at the identified points in the electrical element life cycles (A1B and A2). Other SMEs, focused on the system's software, its mechanisms, its mechanical structures, the humans that 
(I3) Contextual Outcomes
Models in this facet document the entities and relationships that characterize each stage of the system's life cycle and undesired outcomes for each such entity and relationship. This work links to the assessments of (I2) to define the goal/fault states that must be considered in assessment of potential system impacts.
(I2) System Lifecycles
Models in this facet capture the life cycle stages through which the subject system can pass, ways in which the system can transition through these stages, conditions that can trigger each such transition, and the context (entities external to the system and relationships with these entities) in which the system exists in each stage. Assessments here focus on propagation of outcomes (I1) in each context.
(I1) System Outcomes
Models in this facet address the functions the subject system exists to perform and the desired outcomes associated with these functions. Assessments for this facet explore what other potential system outcomes are possible.
Susceptibility
This aspect focuses on how the system is constituted, on what phenomena could lead to failure to deliver desired system outcomes or could result in undesired system outcomes, and on what causal mechanisms with the system and its constituent elements could be involved in these things.
(S1A) System Functional Architecture (S1B) Component Functional Architecture
Models in this facet address the sets of behaviors that define the system and its constituent components and how these functions may vary as a function of immediate context and past history. Assessments for this facet address the linkages between undesired system outcomes (I1) and undesired deviations in system behavior (S1A) and underlying undesired component behavior (S1B).
(S2A) System Physical Architecture (S2B) Component Physical Architecture
Models in this facet identify the logical structure, behaviors, interconnections, and interactions of both the physical components that comprise the system and the parts that comprise these components. Assessments for this facet address the linkages between undesired deviations in system (S1A) and component (S1B) behavior and failure modes in the physical system (S2A) and components (S2B).
(S3A) System Physical Implementation (S3B) Component Physical Implementation
Models in this facet address the physical form of the system and its components and parts, including how they are positioned, oriented, and joined together. Assessments for this facet examine the physical/material vulnerabilities of the system (S3A) and its components (S3B), how they relate to failure modes identified in (S2A) and (S2B), and identify phenomena that could exploit these vulnerabilities.
Exploitability
This aspect of assessment explores how, given associated lifecycles, the system as a whole or its constituent components might come to experience these problematic phenomena.
(E1A) Systemfocused Exploits
(E1B) Componentfocused Exploits
Models in this facet address sequences of phenomena that could trigger vulnerabilities and lead ultimately to undesired outcomes in the system and its components. Assessments for this facet build these sequences based on results of (S2A) and (S2B) and show how given "exploits" consisting of natural events and/or human actions could yield these system (E1A) and component (E1B) sequences.
(E2A) System Lifecycles (E2B) Component Lifecycles
Models in this facet capture those entities and environmental artifacts in the life cycles stage of the system and each of its components that could introduce the kinds of natural events or human actions identified in (E1A) and (E1B). Assessments for this facet explore the potential for identified exploit steps to be realized given the lifecycle of the system (E2A) and its components (E2B).
Accessibility
This aspect focuses on the environments associated with each system and component life cycle stage and how they might enable threat agents to initiate the right sets of problematic events
(A1A) System Environments (A1B) Component Environments
Models in this facet document the physical structure of the environments associated with each of the stages in which the system and each of its components can exist over their life cycles. Assessments for this facet examine vulnerabilities in these system (A1A) and component (A2A) environments that would enable the physical access needed for the exploit steps identified in (E2A) and (E2B).
(A2) Environment-focused Exploits
Models in this facet address the phenomena that could lead to triggering of physical environment vulnerabilities. Assessments for this facet identify these phenomena for each vulnerability identified in (A1A) and (A1B) and ways in which these events and actions could be sequenced to enable system & component exploits addressed in (E1A), E1B), (E2A), and (E2B) 
Threats

(T1) Agent Attributes & Capabilities
Models in this facet capture naturally occurring environmental artifacts and humans who can be associated with each of the physical environments in which the system and its components can exists. Assessments identify the attributes and capabilities of these entities as they relate to phenomena addressed in (A2) and, for human actors, identify the resources needed to enable these phenomena.
(T2) Resources
Models in this facet address resources human agents can use to enable exploits of the system (E1A), its components (E1B), and their associated environments (A2). Assessments for this facet evaluate general scarcity of resources, their deployment relative to the human actors, the ability to acquire and move these resources to locations required, and the ease with which they can be used as is by these agents.
(T3) Interests & Motivation
Models in this fact address characterize potential human actors identified in (T1) with respect to their interests and motivation. Assessments for this facet focus on demonstrated level of interest in systems like the subject system, typical objectives pursued relative to these kinds of systems, propensity to favor given kinds of exploits per (E1A), (E1B), and (A2), and level and duration of motivation.
populate it, etc., would all conduct similar domain-specific analyses. As such, each facet shown in Table 1 represents kinds of information needed and kinds of analyses to be executed, with each "kind" encompassing a range of domainspecific model types and analytic methods
In the course of a given system assessment, the actual number of models and methods that will be employed depends both on the variety of assurance goals the assessment must address and the number and diversity of element types that populate the system. The more goals, the greater the potential for the need for different analytic methods and supporting models. Similarly, the more technologies to be assessed, the greater the number of model types and assessment methods.
Taking this proliferation of models one step further, one of the implications of Table 1 is that there may not be just one "system" that is the focus of assessment but, rather, a whole suite of systems. A system and its constituent components can all transition through their own life cycles. Each life cycle stage defines a different context -a different system, if you will -of which the system or component becomes a part and each of these systems may need to be assessed in order to evaluate the assurance posture of the subject system across its full life cycle.
Finally, since the purpose of system assessment is to understand the assurance posture of the integral subject system and not just its constituent elements, all of the focused models and associated analytic results generated during the assessment must be unified into an integrated whole. Red team SMEs do this as a matter of course, implicitly mapping to each other the various facets touching on their area of responsibility and then combining SME results across the team to deliver the needed integrated system findings. If systems are to assume responsibility for assessment, they too must be able to integrate the various models and analytic results that they produce and maintain in support of the various topics important to assurance posture of the systems.
VI. CAN THIS BE ACHIEVED?
Given the magnitude and complexity of the technical challenges entailed in pursuing this proposed approach, the reader might reasonably ask whether the end proposed is achievable. The best that can be said right now is "maybe". This answer may be surprising in light of the fact that the primary purpose of this paper is to argue that pursuing this goal is essential if the ability to assess systems is to advance. The reason for "maybe" is two-fold. First, no aspect of assessment stands apart from the kind of domain that the given aspect is intended to assess. The ability to determine if and how a given system component can fail in a given context depends on the maturity of the science associated with that kind of component. In some domains, such as classical electrical or mechanical engineering, the science is well developed and techniques for automating analyses based on the science are well understood. In other domains, such as human or some aspects of cyber, the science needed to support systems assessments is less mature, leaving human analysts to make qualitative or possibilistic judgments about behavior of these kinds of elements within a system. As such, the proposed goal is either achievable or not, at least with respect to this dimension, depending on the elements that make up the system being assessed. Second, how completely automated systems will be able to model their environments is still a subject of research. The core question here is what things can be learned by machines via direct observation using the sensing abilities with which a system has been endowed. Consider Figure 4 , a simplified summation of the three broad model spaces that characterize the types of concerns addressed in Table 1 . At one level, a system can be seen as a collection of interconnected physical elements situated in physical world and interacting with each other and with that world. The adverse events and actions a system experiences and the impacts that result all occur in the context of this physical reality. Only some of what a system needs to know about all of this is directly observable by the system, allowing knowledge about both physical and logical aspects of the system and its environment to be derived by the system itself. What remains beyond the reach of systems to self-discover are notions of their own ultimate purpose, certain knowledge about the structure and behavior of non-automated portions of the systems, some portion of "common sense" knowledge regarding how things work in the real world, and ethical knowledge about what actions and impacts are acceptable within the bounds of the contexts the systems occupy. These things will need to be built into system elements at time of design or "learned" by knowledge transfer from other systems at time of use. Even so, these limitations may not be fatal shortcomings. Trends in model-based engineering offer hope of allowing models used for design of systems to be embedded in these same systems to support selfassessment. Work in patterns and modular techniques [10] suggest the potential to compile libraries of model elements that can be used to supply missing knowledge.
Objectives
It should be noted that the real danger in all of this is not the potential of falling short of the proposed goal of systems that assess themselves but of failing to try at all to realize this goal. Even if complete autonomy is not achieved in the assessment of the complex systems of systems that IOT will deliver, pursuing these goals will advance the ability of red teams to assess these kinds of systems. Not pursuing this goal will leave future system developers and operators hopelessly unable to evaluate the assurance posture of their systems, much less take steps to improve this posture.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Traditional, human-dependent approaches to red teaming are inherently incapable of handling the system assessment needs of the large scale, complex systems of systems to which current trends in IOT and autonomy point. The burden of system assessment must be taken on by systems themselves. This will require a deliberate change in mindset by the system assessment community and the establishment of explicit community-supported mechanisms to coordinate research and development is support of this goal. Much of the groundwork needed to enable the individual elements of modeling and analysis that systems would need has already been laid but fundamental challenges remain. Whether these challenges can be overcome is yet to be seen but failing to attempt this will leave the system assessment discipline woefully ill-prepared to meet the challenges that IOT and autonomy will bring.
